PILOT SPIN
Pilot Zone => Accident Review/Never Again (I hope..) => Topic started by: Rush on February 24, 2022, 06:47:52 AM
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The one where the pylon failed and the engine fell off. I like this guy’s videos. My comment is: what were they thinking? With the forklift trying to cut corners. Ugh. The leading edge slats increasing the stall speed? And killing the stall warning/stick shaker? The crew did everything right, they couldn’t have known. The more I learn about what keeps airliners up in the air the less I want to climb aboard one. Give me a simple bugsmasher.
Also, I was trying to post this when I screwed up and posted the Texas primary thread.
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Back then the procedure was to fly V2+10 at engine failure to complete the second and third segment climb, then accelerate to clean up the aircraft.
If the speed was faster than V2+10 it was recommended to increase pitch and bring the speed back. The FP did this in the accident, and with the leading edge control damage he stalled the airplane and ultimately lost control. Had he held the airspeed he had flying he would have likely flown out.
The procedures are different now.
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Back then the procedure was to fly V2+10 at engine failure to complete the second and third segment climb, then accelerate to clean up the aircraft.
If the speed was faster than V2+10 it was recommended to increase pitch and bring the speed back. The FP did this in the accident, and with the leading edge control damage he stalled the airplane and ultimately lost control. Had he held the airspeed he had flying he would have likely flown out.
The procedures are different now.
Yep but he had no way of knowing the leading edge control was gone, unless there was some way for them to figure out the engine and all its controls were literally gone. In the short minute they had to deal with it, and no visualization from the cockpit, there was probably no chance they could have put together what had happened or what they needed to do.
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Yep but he had no way of knowing the leading edge control was gone, unless there was some way for them to figure out the engine and all its controls were literally gone. In the short minute they had to deal with it, and no visualization from the cockpit, there was probably no chance they could have put together what had happened or what they needed to do.
The plane was flying at the higher airspeed. That's key, it was flying and climbing. Because at the time the FAA pounded "V2+10" and anything above was a bust in that training maneuver, the FP instinctively pulled back pitch to decrease speed and that's what ultimately did them in.
This goes along the lines of the Colgan flight in Buffalo. Prior to the accident, the FAA demanded stalls be taught as precision maneuvers, in which say a level flight stall would be hold altitude as speed decreases, and at the onset of the shaker applied max power, hold altitude and recover back to a clean airspeed. A climb or descent meant a maneuver fail.
This went opposite of what stall recognition and recover was actually meant for. Now the maneuver the PF can lower the nose and have an acceptable loss.
Today's V1 cuts are being taught differently. Once the failure is recognized, use the remaining runway to use the landing gear to help align the airplane (correct rudder input) then slowly rotate to about 12 degrees pitch, which most likely means passing V2+10. Accept the pitch and climb for the second segment and start accelerating at third segment. During the second segment the PF has to determine if the speed and heading is getting him where he needs to go, and adjust.
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So what you’re saying is, not only would they have needed to figure out what was happening, they would then have had to go against their training which had not only become second nature, but to go against it would have been to risk being disciplined or something. Not that that’s what they were thinking in the moment, but you are just trained to follow procedure. Given the total circumstances, they were doomed, they had no chance.
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So what you’re saying is, not only would they have needed to figure out what was happening, they would then have had to go against their training which had not only become second nature, but to go against it would have been to risk being disciplined or something. Not that that’s what they were thinking in the moment, but you are just trained to follow procedure. Given the total circumstances, they were doomed, they had no chance.
At the time of this accident, the training was V2+10, anything above was unacceptable. During training, or a checking event, to go outside the standard was a bust. This was thoroughly engrained into everyone.
In this accident they had a flying but badly damaged airplane. By increasing pitch to bring the airspeed back to V2+10, the PF began complicating the problem.
This accident has been studied, broken down and dissected since it happened. A lot of things came out of it that improved safety, such as following manufacturer maintenance procedures, re-evaluating training and engine out/severe damage procedures among others.
As with any accident, it's never just one item that causes the accident, it's a series of small items that lead up to the catastrophic event. Had they broke just one link in the chain, the outcome would have been different.